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During his 34 years on the Supreme 
Court, Justice John Paul Stevens par-
ticipated in thousands of decisions 
that addressed nearly every aspect 
of American law. But he had no doubt 
which one of those decisions was the 
worst: District of Columbia v. Heller.1
He dissented from the opinion at 
length, called it “unquestionably the 
most clearly incorrect decision . . . 
announced during my tenure on the 
bench,”2 and continued to criticize it 
up until his death in July of this year. 
Others, closer to the Justice, have writ-
ten and will write about his remarkable 
tenure on the bench. But we want to 
focus on his Second Amendment opin-
ions and commentary, which we think 
provide insight not only on the right 
to keep and bear arms, but more gen-
erally on the late Justice’s approach to 
law and judging. 
“A well regulated Militia”: 
The Law Before Heller 
In Heller, the Supreme Court held for the 
first time that the Second Amendment 
guarantees a personal right to keep 
and bear firearms for purposes unre-
lated to an organized militia. That 2008 
holding was the culmination of decades 
of effort by gun rights advocates to 
transform the personal purposes inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment 
from a “fraud” — in the words of (then 
retired) Chief Justice Warren Burger — 
into the law of the land.3 
The Second Amendment, which 
reads “a well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms shall not be infringed,”4 
is a linguistic mess. Not even the place-
ment of the commas is certain.5 What 
is certain, though, is that for 200 years 
the vast majority of judges interpreted 
it to protect only those arms, people, 
and activities having some connection 
to an organized militia. 
During that time, the Supreme Court 
directly addressed the meaning of the 
Second Amendment only once, and 
that came in an odd decision involv-
ing the prosecution of a gangster, 
Jack Miller, for transporting a short- 
barreled shotgun in violation of the 
National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA). 
The NFA was Congress’s response to 
the gun-fueled gangland violence of 
the 1920s and ’30s that had besieged 
the nation — including Stevens’s own 
home of Chicago. It strictly regulated 
short-barreled shotguns and other 
weapons, like the Thompson subma-
chine gun, that had become popular 
among mobsters and bootleggers. In 
United States v. Miller,6 the Court held 
that because a short-barreled shotgun 
was not suitable for use in a militia, 
its possession was not protected by 
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the Second Amendment, and Miller’s 
indictment was lawful.
The NFA, which is still in force, was 
the first federal attempt to signifi-
cantly regulate firearms, and it has 
enjoyed some success (for example, 
fully automatic weapons are rarely 
used by criminals today). The NFA, 
though, was unique only in that it was 
a nationwide law. State and local gov-
ernments had been regulating arms 
since the Founding era, with laws that 
ran the gamut from permit require-
ments to prohibitions on particular 
classes of weapons to bans on posses-
sion by particular classes of people. 
Indeed, a search of the Repository 
of Historical Gun Laws, a free online 
resource hosted by the Center for 
Firearms Law at Duke,7 shows that 
more than 1,000 state and federal laws 
had been enacted by the time Justice 
Stevens was born in 1920. 
Despite all this regulation, the Second 
Amendment did not play a significant 
role in firearm policy, because it was 
not generally understood to encompass 
private uses of weapons. It certainly did 
not feature prominently in litigation, 
because few regulations interfered 
directly with state militias. Indeed, 
for more than two centuries, no fed-
eral case struck down a law on Second 
Amendment grounds. 
Although the Amendment remained 
legally inert until 2008, it was polit-
ically galvanizing. Beginning around 
the 1960s, gun rights advocates tried 
to use the 27 words of the Amendment 
to anchor a right to keep and bear 
arms for private purposes like self- 
defense. They found allies in advo-
cacy organizations like the National 
Rifle Association and in certain (and 
sometimes unexpected) quarters of 
the academy. But they never had the 
right vehicle to advance the issue to 
the high court. 
“Original Public Meaning 
Originalism”: Heller, McDonald, 
and Stevens in Dissent
Eventually Dick Heller, a special offi-
cer at the Federal Judicial Center, of all 
places, emerged as an unlikely cham-
pion. Heller wanted to keep a firearm 
in his home for self-defense, but the 
District of Columbia’s regulations 
made that impossible in practice. After 
he lost in the trial court and succeeded 
in the court of appeals, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. The briefing 
was voluminous. Even Vice President 
Dick Cheney joined an amicus brief 
supporting Heller. 
At the same time gun rights advo-
cates promoted their vision of the 
Second Amendment to think tanks, 
thought leaders, and the public, “orig-
inal public meaning originalism” 
emerged as a prominent interpretive 
theory among academics and the judi-
ciary. This kind of originalism rejected 
both “the living constitution” (the idea 
that the Constitution should be read 
as an evolving document) and “origi-
nal intent” (the notion that it should 
be read in accord with the intentions 
of the drafters at the Philadelphia 
Convention). Instead, original pub-
lic meaning originalism claimed to be 
rooted in historical fact: The words 
mean today what a speaker of English 
in the ratifying generation would have 
understood then.
Justice Antonin Scalia, the most vis-
ible advocate for this interpretive 
method, wrote for the five-justice 
majority in Heller. In keeping with 
his methodological commitments, he 
crafted a thoroughly originalist opin-
ion, relying heavily on scholarship and 
historical sources. According to Scalia, 
the central question in Heller was sim-
ple and simply stated: How were the 
words of the Second Amendment typi-
cally understood in 1791? 
Scalia held that the two portions 
of the Second Amendment were dis-
tinct. The “operative” portion was the 
part about the right to keep and bear 
arms; the “prefatory” part was about 
the militia. Resort to the “prefatory” 
part was only necessary if the “oper-
ative” section was ambiguous. But 
the operative portion was absolutely 
clear to the majority: The right was to 
keep and bear firearms for personal 
purposes unrelated to the organized 
militia. In support, Justice Scalia cited 
evidence from the English Declaration 
of Right, Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
and several 19th-century cases and 
materials that post-dated the ratifying 
generation. He dismissed Miller as “an 
uncontested and virtually unreasoned 
case.”8 
Justice Stevens dissented, and did so 
on Justice Scalia’s turf.9 He looked at 
the same historical record, the same 
linguistic facts, and came to the oppo-
site conclusion: A native speaker of 
English, reading the words of the 
Second Amendment in 1791, would 
have understood them to convey a mil-
itary meaning. Although Justice Scalia 
pointed to a few contrary examples, 
Justice Stevens quoted his own words 
back to him: “The Court does not appear 
to grasp the distinction between how a 
word can be used and how it ordinarily 
is used.”10 Most linguists and historians 
agreed with Stevens’s interpretation, 
Justice Stevens 
dissented, and did 
so on Justice Scalia’s 
turf. He looked at 
the same historical 
record, the same 
linguistic facts, and 
came to the opposite 
conclusion.
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emphasizing that the phrase “bear 
arms” in 1791 was used most often in a 
collective, military sense. 
What’s especially notable about 
Stevens’s dissent in Heller is its good 
faith. He was not an originalist, but he 
addressed originalists on their terms, 
using their tools. He could have written 
past the majority opinion and applied 
an evolving constitutional standard to 
resolve the case. But he was convinced 
of the soundness of his argument and 
the receptiveness of his fellow justices. 
Stevens was apparently so convinced of 
the merits of his opinion that he thought 
he could persuade the arch-originalist 
Justice Clarence Thomas to join it.11 
He didn’t, and Heller is now the law. 
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago12 — a case involving gun regu-
lations in Stevens’s beloved hometown 
— the Court had to decide whether 
Heller’s right should be incorporated 
against state and local governments. 
Again, Justice Stevens found himself 
dissenting — this time not only about 
the constitutionality of gun regulation, 
but about how incorporation doctrine 
should be understood. And again, Justice 
Scalia took the other side, writing a con-
curring opinion specifically to take issue 
with Justice Stevens’s approach. 
In both Heller and McDonald, Justice 
Stevens authored powerful dissents 
rooted in history. Those opinions are 
often excerpted in constitutional law 
casebooks, and rightly so. But it would 
be a mistake to read Stevens’s opinions 
as nothing more than a historical mano-
a-mano with Justice Scalia. In terms of 
Second Amendment law and theory, 
they are much more than that. With 
characteristic clarity, the first three 
sentences of his opinion in Heller dis-
solved a decades-old false dichotomy: 
The question presented by this 
case is not whether the Second 
Amendment protects a “collec-
tive right” or an “individual right.” 
Surely it protects a right that 
can be enforced by individuals. 
But a conclusion that the Second 
Amendment protects an individ-
ual right does not tell us anything 
about the scope of that right.13
This is profoundly correct, and deftly 
sidesteps an unhelpful debate in which 
Second Amendment scholarship had 
been mired for decades.
Similarly, in McDonald, the Justice 
demolished the misunderstanding that 
the gun debate is simply about con-
stitutional rights on one side of the 
equation and regulatory priorities on 
the other. Too often, that frame leads 
to the conclusion that only gun owners 
have constitutionally relevant inter-
ests. But as Justice Stevens noted, “Your 
interest in keeping and bearing a cer-
tain firearm may diminish my interest 
in being and feeling safe from armed 
violence.”14 Increasingly, the hard 
questions of firearms law are about 
conflicting rights. 
A “Self-Inflicted Wound”:  
Stevens Reflects on Heller
John Paul Stevens lived a very long life, 
and among the familiar stories he told 
was that, as a 12-year-old growing up 
in Chicago, he’d watched Babe Ruth 
“call his shot” against the Cubs in 1932. 
Stevens had a similar skill at knowing 
where constitutional law would fall 
during his long tenure on the bench. 
His dissent over the constitutionality 
of anti-sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hard-
wick (1986) was vindicated 17 years later 
by Lawrence v. Texas (2003).
 As it happens, the final dissent he 
ever issued, on the last decision day of 
his tenure, was McDonald. It is possi-
ble that someday that decision will go 
down as Justice Stevens’s called shot 
on the right to keep and bear arms, 
and the Supreme Court will revisit its 
decision in Heller. He was not alone in 
wishing as much. Many scholars, com-
mentators, advocates, and even some 
of his fellow justices have called for its 
reconsideration.15 
We have our doubts about whether 
this will happen. As we wrote in 
our recent book, The Positive Second 
Amendment: Rights, Regulation, and 
the Future of Heller (2018), the basic 
holding of Heller — that the Second 
Amendment protects a right to keep 
and bear arms for certain private pur-
poses, including self-defense — seems 
legally and politically secure. 
But we agree with Justice Stevens 
that the Second Amendment, properly 
understood, is not a legal impediment 
to the kinds of reasonable gun regula-
tions that form the mainstream of the 
U.S. gun debate — things like expanded 
background checks, prohibitions on 
unreasonably powerful weapons, and 
limits on possession by especially dan-
gerous persons. In keeping with Heller’s 
admonition (echoed in McDonald) that 
gun rights are not absolute, the num-
ber and percentage of successful legal 
challenges claiming a violation of the 
Second Amendment remains quite low. 
That low rate of success makes even 
more sense when one considers that 
stringent gun regulations are rare, 
leaving only the most reasonable and 
popular regulations open to challenge. 
This is not a target-rich environment 
for gun rights litigators.
Of course, all of that could change. 
Even as we write this, the Supreme 
Court is due to hear oral argument 
in New York State Rifle and Pistol 
Association v. City of New York, a 
potentially major Second Amendment 
case. Some voices both on and off 
the Court have called for an entirely 
new structure for evaluating Second 
Amendment claims — one that would 
apply strict scrutiny across the board, 
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or would evaluate gun laws based 
solely on a rigid test of text, history, 
and tradition. (We have filed an amicus 
brief in support of neither side, argu-
ing that the Court should not impose 
such a radical change in the law.)
But at least for now, even after 
Heller, the primary obstacles to further 
gun regulation in the United States are 
political, not constitutional. The rel-
evant debates are in legislatures, not 
courts. And, to the extent the Second 
Amendment keeps being invoked for 
propositions that it doesn’t support, 
clarifying the law can help improve the 
conversation. 
Perhaps the Justice recognized 
this. After all, he published his post- 
retirement commentary on the Second 
Amendment in the popular press and 
addressed it to the public, not to legal 
elites. In fact, Heller became something 
of a preoccupation for Stevens. It was 
the opinion that kept him up at night,16 
the one that he kept wanting to talk to 
people about. 
First came his book Six Amendments: 
How and Why We Should Change 
the Constitution (2014), in which 
he proposed to amend the Second 
Amendment to read: “A well regu-
lated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms 
when serving in the Militia shall not 
be infringed.”17 Then, in the wake of 
the Parkland shooting, where 17 peo-
ple were killed by a recently expelled 
student on Valentine’s Day 2018, 
Stevens openly called for repeal of 
the Second Amendment in a New 
York Times op-ed. Heller, he said, 
“has provided the N.R.A. with a pro-
paganda weapon of immense power. 
Overturning that decision via a con-
stitutional amendment to get rid of 
the Second Amendment would be 
simple and would do more to weaken 
the N.R.A.’s ability to stymie legisla-
tive debate and block constructive 
gun control legislation than any other 
available option.”18 
Near the end of his life, as the pace of 
mass shootings increased — in schools, 
churches, concert arenas, and clubs — 
and as it became apparent the political 
branches were incapable of addressing 
the violence, Stevens’s agitation grew, as 
did his certainty that Heller was wrong. 
“These mass shootings are peculiar to 
America and are peculiar to a country 
that has the Second Amendment,” he 
lamented in one of his last interviews.19 
“So I think that interpreting the Second 
Amendment to protect the individ-
ual right to own firearms is really just 
absurd, and it’s also terribly import-
ant. It happens over and over and over 
again. I think I should have been more 
forceful in making that point in my 
Heller dissent.”20 His autobiography, 
published just weeks before his death, 
called Heller “the worst self-inflicted 
wound in the Court’s history.”21
Others agree. In addition to express-
ing concern about the social costs, 
legal scholars, linguists, and histori-
ans have cast serious doubt on Heller’s 
basic premises. Most recently, linguis-
tic research using vast databases of 
18th-century materials and “big data” 
techniques unavailable in 2008 have 
tended to vindicate Justice Stevens. 
Linguists like Dennis Baron22 and Neal 
Goldfarb23 and historians like Alison 
LaCroix24 have looked at the material 
and have come to a similar conclusion: 
The phrase “bear arms” was over-
whelmingly used in a collective, 
military sense in 1791, just as Justice 
Stevens had written. 
Whatever its historical or linguis-
tic defects, Heller remains the law of 
the land. We wrote the Positive Second 
Amendment with that assumption at 
the book’s core. And, at least for the 
foreseeable future, Heller is not going 
anywhere. But, as we argue in the 
book, that’s not necessarily bad news 
for the large majority of Americans 
who believe that gun rights and gun 
regulation can co-exist25 — history and 
constitutional law are on their side. Our 
hope was and is that a proper under-
standing of the Second Amendment 
can tone down the rhetoric and pro-
fessionalize the gun debate. We remain 
optimistic. 
Buoyed by that optimism and 
encouraged by friends and colleagues, 
we sent a copy of the book to Justice 
Stevens, hoping for a thank-you note 
at best. What we got back instead was 
some of the verve that must have been 
all too familiar to those who clerked 
for the late justice: 
Thank you for the copy of your 
thoughtful book which I have read 
with interest and admiration. I 
remain somewhat puzzled by why 
you characterize your views as 
“positive” and confess that I regard 
your explanation of reasons why 
the NRA need not fear overrul-
Most recently, 
linguistic research 
using vast databases 
of 18th-century 
materials and “big 
data” techniques 
unavailable in 2008 
have tended to 
vindicate Justice 
Stevens. . . . The 
phrase “bear arms” 
was overwhelmingly 
used in a collective, 
military sense in 1791, 
just as Justice Stevens 
had written.  
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ing Heller as equally explaining 
why the Second Amendment is not 
needed to protect gun manufac-
turers from arbitrary regulation. 
In my opinion the main purpose 
of the amendment is to enhance 
the appeal of NRA arguments 
against additional regulations. No 
other civilized country has such 
an amendment or a comparable 
number of gun-related tragedies. 
I am convinced that the country 
would be better off if the Second 
Amendment were repealed.26
The Justice’s letter, written with 
characteristic force and tact, makes it 
clear that we failed to convince him 
of our “positive” vision for the Second 
Amendment. But, perhaps more 
importantly, we take it as evidence of 
his undiminished optimism that peo-
ple are reasonable and persuadable, 
and that the soundest arguments will 
carry the day in the end. On that, we’re 
in complete agreement. 
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